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Summary  findings
Few  issues in moderni finance  have  inspired  the interest  to im:Irastructure  project  finance  transactions  that  involve
of both  practitioners  and  theoreticians  more  than  risk  the  private  sector.  Developed  in-house  in the Economic
evaluation  and  managemnent. The  basic  principle  Development  Institute  of the  World  Bank,  INFRISK  is a
governing  risk management  in an infrastructure  prolect  guide to  practitioners  in the  field and  a training  tool  for
finance  deal is intuitive  and well-articulated:  allocate  Faising awareness  and  improving  expertise  in the
project-specific  risks to parties  best  able to bear  them  application  of modern  r isk management  techniquies.
(taking  into  account  each  party's  appetite  for,  and  TNFRISK can  analyze  a project's  exposure  to a variety
aversion  to,  risk);  control  performance  risk through  of market,  credit,  and  performance  risks from  the
incentives;  and  use market  hedging  irnstruments  perspective  of key contracting  parties  (project  promoter,
(derivatives)  for  covering  marketwide  risks arising  from  creditor,  and government).  Their  model  is driven  by the
fluctuations  in, for instance,  interest  and exchange  rates,  concept  of  the project's  economic  viability.
among  other  things.  Drawing  on recent  developments  in the literature  on
In practice,  however,  governments  have been  asked  to  project  evaluatior  under  uncertainty,  INFRISK  generates
provide  guarantees  for  various  kinds  of projects,  often  at  probability  distributions  for key decisioni variables,  such
no charge,  because  of preblems  associated  with  rmarket  as a project's  net present  value,  internal  rate  of return,  or
imperfections:  capacity  to serv  ice  its debt  on  time  during  the  life of the
*  Derivative  markets  (swaps,  forwards)  for  currency  project.
and  interest-rate  risk  hedging  either  do not  exist  or are  Computationaily,  INFRISK  works  in conjunction  with
inadequately  developed  in most  developing  countries.  Microsof'-t Excel  and supports  both  the  construction  and
- Limited  contracting  possibilities  (because  of  the operation  phiases of a capital  investment  project.  For
problems  with  credibility  or enforcement).  a particular  risk variable  of interest  (such  as the revenue
Differing  methods  for  risk  measurement  and  stream,  operations  and maintenance  costs,  and
evaluation.  construction  costs,  among  others)  the  program  first
Two  factors  distinguish  the financing  of infrastructure  generates  a stream  of probability  distributions  for  each
projects  from  corporate  and traditional  limited-recourse  year  of a project's  life through  a Monte  Carlo  simulation
project  finance:  1) a high  concentration  of project  risk  technique.  One  of the key contributions  made  by
early in the project  life cycle (pre-completion),  and  2) a  INFRISK  .s to enable  the use of a broader  set of
risk profile  that  changes  as the project  comes  to fruition,  probability  distributions  (uniform,  normal,  beta,  and
with  a relatively  stable  cash flow subject  to market  and  lognormal)  in conducting  Monte  Carlo  simulations
regulatory  risk  once  the project  is completed.  rather  than  relying  only on the  commonly  used  normal
Dailami,  Lipkovich,  and  Van Dyck  introduce  distribution.  A user's  guide  provides  instruction  on the
INFRISK,  a computer-based  risk-management  approach  use of the  package.
This paper  - a product  of the Regulatory  Reform  and Private  Enterprise  Division,  Economic  Development  Institute  -is
part of a larger effort in the institute  to address  the training  needs of Bank client countries  as well as support  the Bank's  owln
lending  and advisory  services in promoting  infrastructture  development  and rnodernization  in developing  countries.  Copies
of this  paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,  Washington,  DC  20433.  Please contact  Bill
Nedrow,  room  G2-072,  telephone  202-473-1585,  fax 202-334-8350,  Internet  address  wnedrow  Cowocldbank.org.  Policy
Research  Working  Papers  are also  posted  on the Web  at http:i//www.worldbank.orgilhtml"dec"Publications!Workpapers/
home.html.  The  authors  may  be  contacted  at  mdailamidfworldbank.org,  ilipkovich@(§rworldbank.org,  or
jvandyck@worldbank.org.  March  1999.  (33 pages)
The Plolicy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in prog  ress to encourage the exchange  of ideas  about
developrment  issues.  An objective of the  series is to get the  findings out  quicUEl, eve7n1,f  the presenstations  are less than  fully polished'. T'he
papers carrv  the  names  of  the authors  and  sho,ld  be  cited  accordingly.  Tie  findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  expressed  in  this
paper  are entirely  those  of  the  authoors. They  do siot necessarily  represent  the  'ieur of  the  W"orld Bank,  its  Executive  Directors,  or the
cotntries they represent.
Produced  by the  Policy Research  Dissc'anafion  CenterA computer  simulation  approach  to risk management  in
infrastructure  project finance  transactions




John  Van Dyck
Regulatory  Reform  and  Private  Enterprise  Division
Economic  Development  Institute  of the World  BankManaging  Risk
Few issues in modem finance  have inspired  the interest  of both practitioners  and
theoreticians  more  than the subject  of risk evaluation  and management.' "The ability  to
understand,  measure,  and  weigh risk is," according  to Peter Bernstein,  "at the heart of
modem life. 2" Virtually  every investment  and financing  decision involving  intertemporal
allocation  of resources  under uncertain  conditions  is associated  with some  risk, which  is
in effect,  either assumed  in the expectation  of a higher return, or is transferred  to others
through  hedging  and/or contracting  arrangements.
Yet, increased  exposure  to risk has been an inevitable  consequence  of recent
economic,  technological,  and financial  changes,  which  have come to represent  the
defining themes  of the 1990s.  These include  the globalization  of economic  activity,  the
mobility of capital  flows across  national  boundaries,  widespread  privatization  of public
sector  enterprises,  intensified  competition,  and high volatility  in international  financial
and currency  markets. In the face of such paradigmatic  developments,  the viability  of
long-term capital  investments,  particularly  in the core  infrastructure  sectors of power,
transport and telecommunications,  hinges critically  on how risks associated  with such
investments  are evaluated  and managed.
The basic principle  governing  risk management  in an infrastructure  project
finance deal is intuitive  and well articulated: 3 allocate  project-specific  risks  to parties  best
able to bear  them (taking  into account  each party's appetite  for and aversion  to risk),
control  performance  risk through  incentives,  and use market  hedging instruments
(derivatives)  for covering  market-wide  risks arising  from fluctuations  in, for instance,
interest and exchange  rates. In practice,  however,  difficulties  arise due to market
imperfections,  i.e., derivative  markets  (swaps,  forwards)  for currency  and interest  rate
risk hedging  that are either  non-existent  or not sufficiently  developed  in most emerging
countries,  limited  contracting  possibilities  (due to enforceability  and credibility
problems),  and differing  methodologies  for risk measurement  and evaluation. As a
result, governments  have  been asked to provide  guarantees  for various kinds to projects,
often at no charge.
Project  Risk Evaluation
There are two important  aspects  of infrastructure  project finance that distinguish  it
from corporate  and traditional  limited  recourse  project  finance:  (a) a high concentration
of project risks in the early  phase of project life cycle,  i.e. the pre-completion  phase;  and
' Not surprisingly, risk management has grown in recent years into a mature discipline with a wealth of literature,
specialized skills, and sophisticated computer-basted systems that can be applied to investment project appraisal,
pension plans, portfolio asset allocation, credit derivatives, regulatory capital adequacy for the banking sector,
and derivative trading.
2 See Bernstein (1996).
3The  argument for risk management in project finance is stronger than in corporate finance.  In the case of corporate
finance, the argument for risk management or hedging rests on the notion that hedging adds value to the extent
that it helps ensure that a company has sufficient internal funds available to take advantage of attractive
investment  opportunities.  See Froot, Scharfstein,  and Stein  (1993). In a project  finance  deal, risk management
bears directly on the success or failure of the project.(b) a risk profile that undergoes important changes as the project comes to fruition, with a
relatively stable stream of cash flows that is subject to market and regulatory risks once
the project is completed.  Figure 1 below describes the main risks that arise in the
development and operational phases.
Figure  1:  Project  life  cycle:  main  risks
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Risk Management  Through  Contracts
Project finance transactions are typically governed by a nexus of long-term formal
contracts, written between the project promoter, the host country government, creditors,
input suppliers, contractors, operators, and service providers (in the case of power).
Three classes of contracts are important: concession agreements that stipulate a property
rights transfer from the government to the project company, performance contracts
between the project company and contractors and operators, and loan contracts between
creditors and the project company.  Such contracts are designed to share risk and to
protect contracting parties against opportunistic "hold-up" behavior by others.  In
practice, they address two important characteristics of infrastructure investments: (i) a
high degree of asset specificity; and (ii) large project-specific risks that cannot be
diversified in financial markets.
In such "relationship-specific" investments, i.e. constructing a power plant, road,
or bridge which cannot readily be removed and used elsewhere, investors are hesitant to
make investments without adequate contractual protection.  Once the investment is sunk,
the incentive system and the bargaining power of contracting parties change vis-a-vis
each other.4 Anticipating such an outcome, project promoters often insist on
governments providing various kinds of guarantees to cover, for instance, the credit risk
of the power purchaser under an IPP arrangement, or a minimum level of revenue in a
toll road project.
4 See Dailami and Klein (1999) for a further discussion of the contracting forms in infrastructure finance transactions
and for a review of the related literature.
2INFRISK:  A Tool for Risk  Management
This study introduces  INFRISK,  a computer  based risk management  approach  to
infrastructure  project finance  transactions  that involve  the private sector. Increasing  the
participation  of the private sector  in the provision  and financing  of infrastructure  services
is a common  policy  objective  in countries  around  the world. As governments  are turning
to private  firms as owners,  operators,  and financiers  of infrastructure,  the traditional
financing  structures  and risk allocation  strategies  (once based on the sovereign's  ability  to
tax and borrow)  are now giving way  to a reliance  on fee-based  project financing  where
risk management  takes on a far greater  importance.
INFRISK,  developed  in-house  within the Economic  Development  Institute  of the
World  Bank, is intended  as a guide  to practitioners  in the field and as a training  tool for
raising  awareness  and expertise  in the application  of modern  risk management
techniques. It is capable  of analyzing  a project's exposures  to a variety of market,  credit,
and performance  risks from the perspective  of key contracting  parties  in an infrastructure
transaction,  i.e. the project  promoter,  creditor,  and the government. An infrastructure
project is brought  to financial  closure,  i.e. a transaction  takes place,  when these parties
strike  a balance,  reaching  a common  ground  of interest and understanding.
Figure  2:  Major  Parties  to an  Infrastructure  Project:  Analytical  Framework
i",
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It is useful to think of this common  ground  as the solution  to a bargaining  game
within which  each party maximizes  its objectives,  subject  to the constraints  set by the
willingness  of others to participate. Modeling  such a sequential  multi-party  bargaining
game is difficult,  as most game theoretic  approaches  rely heavily on the idea of "utility,"
which  is difficult  to apply  operationally. 5 The perspective  that drives  the INFRISK
"analytic"  is the concept  of the economic  viability  of a project (see Box 1).
5 While  the objectives  of the creditor  and project  promoter  can be reasonably  specified  as the security  of loaned  funds
and the optimization  of investment  value,  respectively,  the government  presents  difficulties.  Even  a simplistic
fiscalist  approach  to governments'  behavior  requires  the estimation  of social  welfare  losses  from  discriminatory
taxation  and the social  cost-benefit  calculus  of the public  finance  alternative.
3Box 1: Economic Wability of a Project
The economic  viability of a project is an important concept in the process of project selection, and can
be analyzed at two levels. The first level takes into account the particular regulatory structure  in place
for the project, including  the determination  of a tariff and the type of government  support (guarantees,
fiscal incentives,  and credit enhancement). Here, viability  boils down to whether cash flows are
sufficient  to service the project's debt on time, and to pay a fair return to its equity holders. At a
deeper level of analysis, however,  economic viability  also depends heavily on the consistency  of the
tariff rate, the government's credibility in honoring a contracted  rate level, and the project's cash flow
stream. Project viability therefore hinges on the government's tariff policy and support for the project,
since cash flows in monopolistic  markets  depend importantly  on the tariff charged.
We analyze project  viability from the perspective  of creditors  and equity holders in the project. From
the viewpoint of equity holders, we focus on the main project metrics such as IRR and NPV. A
project's IRR is a function of the tariff charged on the supply of infrastructure services, government
support, and the financing  mix and terms; more specifically,  we assume:
IRR =  f(m,r,l,s, ir)
Where m is debt maturity, r is interest rate, I is a measure of the project's debt-equity ratio, ir is the
tariff charged, and s represents  a vector of government  support, i.e. tax incentives,  depreciation
allowances, and guarantees  provided to the project. In general IRR is an increasing function of m, 1,  s
and ir, but a decreasing  function  of r.
From the creditor's  perspective, we focus on the project's capacity  to borrow. We define loan
payment capacity in terms of two main leverage ratios: i.e. interest coverage and debt service
coverage. From a lender's point of view, the key criteria are the probability that such coverages  are
not less than some target levels, thus defining  the following  probabilities:
Prob[Interest  coverage < aJ] = F1
Prob[Debt  service coverage  < a2] =  82
Where a, and a2 are leverage coverage  ratios, and E1 and 62 are the respective confidence levels  with
which the lender feels comfortable.
Earnings  Before Interest  and Taxes
Interest  coverage  =  ______  _________
Interest  Payment
Debt Service Coverage  =  Earnings  Before Interest,  Tax and Depreciation
Interest-+  Principal  Repayment
I - Tax Rate
The government's  willingness  to participate is given by a social welfare function, W,  defined as:
i  Al  - (1 + A)(t),  if the investment is made {0,  if there  is no investment  }
where 0 < A < 1 is a measure of welfare-loss  from distortionary  taxation, I is the project's investment
size, and t is the present value of the net transfer  of resources  from the government  to the private
sector.
4Project evaluation under uncertainty
INFRISK draws on recent developments in the literature on project evaluation
under uncertainty6 to generate probability distributions for key decision variables, such as
a project's net present value (NPV), internal rate of return (IRR), or a project's capacity
to service its debt on time during the life of the project.  Such distributions are then used
in assessing a project's  economic viability, which is taken as the key criterion in project
selection. Thus, judgement on the economic viability of a project is not based solely on a
single "best estimate" of a project's  metrics, i.e. net present value or debt service
capacity, but also on the possible ranges of such variables and the likelihood of their
occurrence within given ranges (see Box 1).
INFRISK is capable of handling several sources of uncertainty and risk bearing on
a project's economic viability.  Such risks, for example, could be associated with the
revenue stream (tariff rate, demand forecast for electricity in a power project, or traffic
volume forecast in a toll road project), operations and maintenance costs, and
construction cost.  The user has the option of choosing the key risk variable or variables
upon which to focus, depending on the specific features of the infrastructure project at
hand and the questions being addressed.
For a particular risk variable of interest, the program first generates a stream of
probability distributions for each year of a project's life through a Monte Carlo
simulation technique, the methodology for which is well known and is described in Box 2
and Annex 1. Typically, the relevant risk variable in a project, i.e. demand forecast,
costs, and tariffs can be quantified in terms of both single best-guess estimates as well as
a range of estimates over the life of a project or the early years in a project's life.  Using
such information, a suitable probability distribution is assigned to each risk variable
within a specified range.  Care must be taken to ensure that such a priori assigned
probability distributions are consistent with the economic/statistical time series
characteristics of relevant risk variables.  For instance, exchange rates are known to obey
a log-normal distribution, while revenue from a toll-road project is likely to exhibit an
asymmetric probability distribution profile, such as a Beta distribution.  INFRISK offers
the flexibility of incorporating four classes of probability distributions (uniformn,  normal,
lognormal, and beta) which provide a broad menu of probabilistic representation of
relevant economic variables in an infrastructure project.
Specification of uncertainty through time may affect a project's  cash flows and is
also an important issue in project valuation. The pattern according to which uncertainty
is resolved over time clearly varies from project to project, and requires careful
consideration.  For most infrastructure projects, the nature of risk changes fundamentally
as the project reaches completion and is ready for operation.  For this reason, INFRISK
explicitly recognizes the two main phases of project development and project operation.
To specify how risk evolves over time, we focus on the variance of a given risk variable.
6 The literature on project appraisal under uncertainty goes back to Hertz (1964, 1979) and work done at The World
Bank in the early 1  970s (Pouliquen, 1970, World Bank, 1970). Subsequent contributions include Hertz and
Thomas (1983), and most recently, the application of real option-theoretic models to project valuation.  See also
Paddock, Siegel and Smith (1988); as well as Copeland and Keenan (1998).
5As shown in Box 2, information on the evolution of variance can be obtained from the
time series' characteristics of the variable, or from the estimated range.7
Computationally, INFRISK works in conjunction with Microsoft Excel and
supports both the construction and the operation phases of a capital investment project.
The input to the simulation exercise includes data on projected revenues, operating costs,
and other risk variable inputs which are part of the standard forecasting and cash flow
analysis.
INFRISK  Analytics
At the heart of INFRISK is a generic financial model, describing the year to year
uses and sources of funds in the context of the project's initial capitalization, its income-
expenditure flows, cash flows, as well as certain specific accounts established for
servicing of debt (debt service reserve), operations and maintenance, tax payments, and
general accounts (see Table 3 in the Annex).  The drawdown of funds during the
construction period and the distribution of cash flows during the operation phase are
governed by a hierarchy of claims embedded in the contracts and loan covenants.  If a
project, for instance, takes three years to be constructed and the distribution of total
capital  expenditures is given by 25% (1st  year), 50% (2nd year), and 25% (3rd year), it is
assumed that equity funds are also drawn according to the same pattern.  INFRISK,
however, has the flexibility of incorporating a different pattern of capital expenditure
disbursement, as well as equity drawdown, depending on the particular project at hand.
Driving the financial model are project specific sub-models determining operating
revenues and costs, as functions of tariffs, capacity, output, and input prices and
quantities.  In a power project, for instance, operating revenues could consist of payments
for electric generating capacity and energy, and associated steam (in a cogenerated plant),
as provided under the Power Purchase Agreement, and operating costs dependent on fuel
usage and prices as well as the operation and maintenance expenses.
Currently, INFRISK operates on an annual, year-by-year basis.  Work, however, is
underway to introduce calendar time (day, month, year) as the basis for analysis in line
with the actual functioning of financial markets and contracts.
Box 2: Probabilistic-based  simulation
Technically, the stochastic process {  Y,  I  t1.  T } can represent the possible realization of a risk variable,
Y,  in an infrastructure project, over the project's  lifetime, where T is the life of the project, i.e. concession
period.  It is useful to represent the value of Y  in year t ( Y,  ) as the sum of its projected value, Au,  and a
random variable, u,, as follows:
Y,-  (1)
U= a,  1/2 £(2)
7 In much of the finance  literature,  risk is  modeled  to evolve  monotonically  with time,  through  the dominant  application
of diffusion  process  of Brownian  motion,  where  variance  increases  through  time.
6where { ct  } is an independently distributed random sequence, with a mean of zero and unit variance, that
is, E ( s1)  0, var ( E,) = 1, E ( s, , 6, ) = 0, and  t  ￿  s.
From equations (1) and (2), it is easy to see that E ( Y,) = Au,,  and  var ( Y,) =  a, as ( t = 1,...,T).  Thus in
generating the probability distribution functions {  F, (c)  t  1,..  , T } for { Y, }, it is necessary to specify ,A,,
a, as well as the specific distribution fonn of e,.
In principle, ,u,  can be estimated from infonnation contained in a project description. In the case that { Yt
t,..  .,T }  represents a project's  operating revenues, for instance, it is possible to write p, = ,u  ( Xt,  6 )
where Xt is a vector of exogenous variables indicating relevant demand and technical factors and ,8 is a
corresponding vector of fixed parameters.  In this case Au,  can be interpreted as the projected or forecasted
operating revenues over a project's  lifetime, which is generated from assumptions on the tariff structure,
demand forecast, and any indexation or escalation factor involved.
Computationally, the Monte Carlo simulation technique used in INFRISK is based on N randomly sampled
iterations ( N = 1000 ) for a risk variable {  Yt  I  1,.  .,  T }.  The ilh  iteration is given by:
Y,i=  + +1  ,(3)
for each year in the life of the project.  Thus, focusing on the first year of the project's  operation, we have:
Yl' =j`+  fa  ef  (4)
One representation of (4) is the Martingale process, suggested by Hurley (1998), which is given by:
Y,=  Y,,  + u,  (5)
u, =a  6,,  (6)
letting a, =  62 y''.  Then we have E ( Y,)=  Y  t=  1,...,T and
vrY  (I  - ' ),5,  ,.,  7
In most cases analysts have reliable information not only about the projected Au,,  but also a range
range(Y,)= maxY, - min Y,  } within which ,  can be assumed to lie. Using the information on the
projected range of a risk variable, it is possible to estimate a  Thus, for the normal distribution, we
estimate the standard deviation  in the first year as:
,  range(Y,)  (8)
d
where  the constant  d can be taken  as 6, given that  for the normal  distribution  most of the
data (approximately 99.7%) falls in the interval of 6 standard deviations around the mean.
For the uniform distribution, el  - U(-0.5 range(YI), 0.5 range(Yi)), and
range(Y,)  (9)
V12
For the transformed beta distribution,  ul  - range(YI)beta(a, b)+A,  (A is the mean
preserving constant),  A = YI - range(Y, )a I(a + b), and
a  = range(Y)  - 0.16(rangel)  (10)
1  a+b+l)  a+b
when a=2, b =5, for instance.
7Model  of an IPP - The  Indiantown  Cogeneration  Project
To illustrate  the application  of INFRISK  to a real-life  project,  we draw on the
Indiantown  Cogeneration  Project  in this section. This project provides  an excellent  test
case due to the extensive  amount  of
detailed  public information  that is  Indiantown  Cogeneration Project
available on the project's  financing mix,  Characteristics of the project
regulatory  environment,  and projected  *  LIai-  I.diantaon.Flolda,  USA
operating  results  which are contained  in  . Capacidt  330 MW
the prospectus  for the 1994  bond issues.  . P.,  ,P-rhas  Sa  leof bothc  p  odly  ndeneto
This information  is readily obtainable  AgreemeMT.  FfondtPoer  and Liyh  p(1996.2025)
through  the U.S. Securities  and Exchange  (2) catiiable mondhly  enypayrgl
Comrnission  and the project  company. A  . FinandngTenns:  (I) SiO5nFi.tMoriageBon.ds,tentamnch.
detailed examination of the Indiantown  (2)  ih2iae  Taex  e  7mpt  BondS  in8  t5ao
project is also available from Finnerty
(1996).
The Indiantown Cogeneration Project is a coal-fired facility with an electric
generating capacity of 330 megawatts (MW) and a steam export capability of 175,000
pounds per hour.  Construction of the facility, located in Martin County, Florida, began
on October 21, 1992 and was completed in 1996. Construction of the project was
financed with a $140 million equity contribution from the partners, $505 million in First
Mortgage Bonds (1994), and $125 million in tax-exempt bonds (1994) arranged through
the Martin County Industrial Development Authority.
The project company  entered into a  Indiantown  Cogeneration  Project
30-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
with the Florida  Power & Light  Company  pcmpnY:
(FPL),  a utility  under  the regulatory
authority of the Florida Public Service
Commission.  FPL's service area covers 35  P-o  ePu.e.unAgrmt:
counties in Florida with a population of 6  FRndnPomedtUgog  idie.tD  C
million or approximately half the  of .M.)
population of Florida.  The PPA features a  R  -
two-tiered pricing arrangement consisting
of: (i) a fixed capacity charge covering
fixed operational costs, and other financial commitments; and (ii) a variable energy
charge covering costs of fuel and variable operations and maintenance expenses.
Additionally, the project company contracted to provide its cogenerated steam to the
Caulkins Indiantown Citrus Company for a period of 15 years.
The following section presents a simplified financial model of such an IPP. The
purpose is to highlight the implications for project viability of the credit risk of the utility
off-taker.  The model focuses on features such as pricing and long-term contracting,
which are common in IPPs. 8
8 See Dailami (1999) for a more detailed discussion.
8The basic equations determining contracted revenues, expenses, and escalation
factors can be summarized as:
Basic equations:
Electric operating revenue:
Rt =8760[XM(;rc  + zf  )]+)eQt  (1)
Electric output:
Qt  dtM  (2)
Operating costs:
Et  = f(M)Pf  +OMt  (3)
Operating income:
It  = Rt  - Et  (4)
Escalation factors:
Tf  = )rf  (1 + gl)t  (6)
7ct  = ,e (I + g 2 )t  (7)
pf  =Pf  ( 1+ g)t1  (8) t  1I  g
where:
Rt  =  contracted electricity revenue in year t (million US$)
M  installed capacity (MW)
A  capacity payment multiplier
f  =  capacity rate ($/KWh)
Wf  =  fixed capacity rate for operational costs ($/KWh)
o-f  =  variable unit energy price ($/KWh)
OMt  operations and maintenance expenses
Q  energy  produced  (KWh  x 103)
gi  =  rate of inflation in the GDP price deflator
g2  =  projected rate of inflation in the fuel price
In discussing revenue risk, we first distinguish between a contracted level of
revenue  Rt  and the actual level of revenue  At  . The actual level of revenue will be a
random variable depending on the level of actual demand and whether the utility actually
pays as agreed.
9To incorporate the credit risk of utility off-takers, we have:
Rt  = min(Rt .Z )  (9)
where Zt  is a random variable reflecting the capacity payment of the off-taker.
We assume that the payment capacity of the utility off-taker can be characterized
by a nornal  probability distribution with a mean equal to its promised or contracted
payment to the IPP, i.e. R, and a standard deviation of  9'/o. Thus:
Z  N(R,0 2 R2 )  (10)
Note that 0 measures the degree of riskiness of the utility off-taker.  The higher
the value of 9, the higher the riskiness or the lower the creditworthiness of the off-taker.
Figures 3, 4, and 5 show respectively, the simulated probability distributions for
the Indiantown Power project's net present value, dividend payment, and debt service
ratio in the year 2005.9
9 Alternatively,  the payment  capacity  of power  purchaser  can be characterized  by two  distributions:
(i) a discrete  distribution  describing  that  the power  purchaser  is not able to serve  its contractual
value  R, on time  and in full. Let  this probability  be P, in  year t.
(ii) given that the power  purchaser  is in default,  let the proportion  of contracted  value  that can be
recovered  in year t be denoted  by a random  variable  y,, with support  (Osy,sl  ), and with  the
conditional  probability  distribution  #,(e),  which  can be assumed  to obey a beta distribution.  In this
case, R  will be determined  by the joint distribution  ofp and  y, i.e. R = g(p, y) with the expected
value given by E(R )  R  (I - P ) + Pt  Rt fo  YoSt  (y)dy.  See  Dailami  (1999)  for details  on this
t  t  t
approach.
10Figure  3:  Probability  Distribution  of Net Present  Value
Riskfactor:  Total Revenue
Histogram of Monte Carlo Simulation, 1000  iterations
180  ---
160  1  Mean:  25.71
1-  Median:  27.89
j  ')  120  +Prob.  <0:  19.7%
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Net present  value  of Indiantown  Power  Project
Figure  4:  Probability  Distribution  of Dividend  in Year  2005
Riskfactor:  Total Revenue
Histogram  of Monte Carlo  Simulation,  1000 iterations
180-
180  - I  Mean:  35.71 160 I
140 2  Median:  36.32
120  Probability  < 0:  9.5%






11Figure  5:  Probability  Distribution  of Debt  Service  in Year  2005
Riskfactor:  Total Revenue
Histogram  of Monte  Carlo  Simulation,  1000  iterations
180-  Mean:  1.36
160  Median:  1.37
140  Probability  < 1.25:  41.3%
L  120,





Debt  Service Coverage, 2005
Figure  6:  Probability  Distrbution  of Interest  Service  in  Year  2005
Risk factor:  Total Revenue
*  ~~Histogram  of Monte  Carlo  Simulation,  1000  iterations
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160-  Mean:  2.07
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13This user  guide is divided  into  three main sections:
1.  Inputting  project  data into INFRISK
II.  Using  the dialog  boxes  to specify  desired  setings for the simulation
III.  Customizing  and understanding  the simulation  output
1.  Inputting Project Data into INFRISK
In INFRISK, the project data for the simulation is inputted both through an input
sheet and the INFRISK dialog boxes.  The input sheet contains fundamental project data
for each year of the project.  The data on this sheet is divided into two sections: one for
the construction period and one for the operational period.
The program offers a large degree of flexibility when the user is creating her own
input sheet. Different types of inputs can be placed anywhere within the appropriate
section (construction or operation) and in the order of the user's choice. However, the
two sections must be separated, and each of them starts with the heading line that labels
the subsequent columns with the year identifiers (i.e., 1992, 1993, etc.). For the
Construction Phase table, the heading line must contain YRCON in the second column
(as shown on the example sheet below). Correspondingly, for the Operation Phase table,
the heading line must contain YROPER in the second column.  To identify the data, the
user must include the appropriate label (for example, "OR" for operating revenues) in the
second column as in the example below.  The label in the first column is for descriptive
purposes only and may be customized as desired by the user.  Annex 1 provides a
typology of flow and stock variables familiar to INFRISK.
Figure 7:  INFRISK  Input  Sheet
FinancongCoslsdoringC  ..n.t-o-o  IK  USD  0  .50.6  98.e88
C.pilaIConsW1lIoeCos-  .CK  USO  109.8825 105.6825  1096825  109  825
R.44e98el1.nges89rCKdeorandorn1Ru00uellons  Cl2oKAng,  USD  21.9355  219385  211340  21.93G5
DBA-t2  US0  0  12  B  o
DBA-11  USD  0  113  0  3
Othe -. i841 -~edft8  COlK  USO  49249  49.849  41.849
Eq8A8  ES  9US  109.88  30.32  0  0
End,gEEhR.t.  El  US9  1  I  1 
DBA-1  USO  0  4.21  0.157  0
DBA.2  USD  0  8  4.39e  0
6BA.3  USO  0  8  4.8S  0
DBA.4  US  8  0  4.C5M  8
DBA-S  US9  0  0  5.132-  0
DBA-6  USD  0  0  S.133.  0
DBA-7  USO  0  8  9828  0
OBA-S  USO  0  0  4.998  0
MEAS  LUSO  0  0  197.839  0
00A-10  l8o  U  0  819.01  250.392
Ph.s.  298oPh~  1wr  .I3W7  7W  1JAW  .ftw  wt  JW
Filed  Cap.o  Pp-n,t  US9  118.412  123.575  124212  124.937  125.79  126.W31  12A40S  ¶2Y337
V.i.b,R P....  USO  49.4041  61.844  63.834  888894  688572  84831  738974  70819
1MM8 18 38.419  189248  188.891  184284  191.442  201.38  228 18
s7R-d,-P  aq#i3Av?  OR  US9  49.404  61.844  83.834  68884  66.575  64.931  73974  76.818
ORR.7g.  US0  24.702  30.9.2  31.917  33.047  342875  32A255  35.587  36.4095
0US  14.503  1.485-  18.007  17.795  16.757  20.025  21.3=3  18.81
The program also permits the user to switch easily between different sets of
projections for a project.  This is done on the main dialog (shown on the next page) by
selecting the name of the sheet containing the desired data in the combo box labeled
"input sheet."
1411.  Using  the dialog  boxes  to specify  desired  settings  for the simulation
The INFRISK  Main Dialog
Once the main proj  ect data are entered in the input sheet, the user can specify the
settings regulating the functioning of the INFRISK  simulation.  This is done through the
main dialog's key sections, which cover the following areas:
- Macroeconomic  Parameters
- Construction  Cost  (Note: Information  on construction  costs  can be viewed  but
not changed in the dialog box.  It can only be changed on the input sheet.)
*  Risk Variables
*  Debt  Capital  Info
*  Equity Capital Info
Output Options
Clicking  the  mai  button in  any  of  these  sections allows  the user  to modify the
simulation settings. For example, to set the tNxrISK  simultionedit  button in the
macroeconomic parameters section, which will open a dialog where the tax rate can be
changed.Thefnothngeoin  pages give a more detailed breakdown of the capabilities of each
of the sections of the main dialog box.
15Macroeconomic  Parameters
IWsUT_-;AuTA%-xVt  ParameteFs  Ii
DlscU  rate
4  Tax  Rate
fW  Asses  Ufe fr  DepwjaWn  (yewrs)
Welfare-Loss  Mease of  t&K*Ion 
In this dialog, the user can specify the main macroeconomic parameters that have direct
influence on a project's  cash flows, such as the applicable discount rate, the corporate
income tax rate, allowable asset life for calculating depreciation for tax purposes, and a
measure of welfare-loss due to distortionary taxation (used in the INFRISK social welfare




Total  Cost  (Lcu)  1438.73
Constuctkon  Costs  Aiocauton
1992  1993  1T  1996
1iO9,w8  1109.68a  ji09,  11  F,
This dialog is for infornational  purposes only and allows the user to view
information on the construction period, total construction cost, and the allocation
schedule of costs over the construction period.  Changing this data can be done through
the specified input sheet via the variable labeled as CK.
16Risk  Variables
INFRISK  is capable  of handling  several  sources  of uncertainty  and risk that
influence  a project's economic  viability. Such  risks, for example,  could  be associated
with revenue  stream  (tariff rate or traffic  volume  forecast  in a toll road project),
operations  and maintenance  costs, and  projected construction  cost (in an IPP). The user
has the option of choosing  the key "risk variable"  upon which  to focus,  depending  on the
specific  features  of the infrastructure  project  at hand.
For a particular  risk variable,  the program  generates  a number of probability
distributions  for each year of the project's life (concession)  using a Monte Carlo
simulation  technique.
INFRISK can use one of four
5eVrs~t40:E  d  probability  distributions
~Exch  Rae . Reveues  &  Mantenance  (uniform, normial, beta, and
Constructionte  CostRts  l  '0  t  Operations  &Maintenance  log-normal)  as the error
Other  Operating  Expenses  j  generator. Uncertainty  through
time is incorporated by
specifying how the parameter (i.e. mean and variance)
changes over time (see Annex
for details).
Once a variable  is selected  for the Monte Carlo simulation,  the Risk Variable
Options dialog  opens,  allowing  the user  to specify  the desired  options. The projection  of
the data section  of this dialog  determines  the source  of data for the variable  - it is either
stored in the input sheet specified  in the main dialog,  or can be generated  according  to the
user's specifications  (by specifying  lag, intercept,  and slope). By manipulating  these
1 7three parameters, the user can specify a variety of models.  For instance, the random walk
process for the logs of exchange rate can be easily specified by putting a unit coefficient
for the lagged value and zeros for all other.  If the user does not know the values for some
parameters, he can check the estimated option, then INFRISK will use the data specified
at the data for  estimation textbox to obtain its own estimate.
The Random Component section allows the user to specify the distribution
function, and other parameters associated with it. If the data are expected to possess a
stochastic term, the user can provide the parameters for the error term, namely its
distribution and the standard deviation.  Several options can be used to specify the
standard deviations for the random process:
*  User-defined standard deviation
*  Estimated from the historical data (the location to historical data is specified
in the data for  estimation text box) using their residuals from the trend or
deviations from a random walk model (first differences), when the projected
values are used as the mean.
*  Estimated from the ranges provided by the user in the input sheet. The ranges
must be labeled following the format <VarLabel>Range (for instance,
"ORRange").
In this section, the user can also specify the following:
*  Distribution.  Allows the user to select the probability distribution function for the
error term.  Presently, INFRISK can handle four different error distributions:
Normal, Lognormal, Beta, and Uniform.  The "Beta distribution" option allows
the user to model the errors around the trend using a right-skewed distribution
based upon a member from the beta family (as an example, see Box 4 for a formal
description of Beta distribution, its probability density function, and some
important parameters).
*  Positioning.  Specifies whether the selected distribution is positioned around,
above, or below the trend. Also the user can truncate all generated values above
or below the mean value of the given distribution.
*  Correlated With option allows the user to impose a certain correlation between
pairs of random variables.  For instance, in our example, the random component
of Revenues can be correlated with the random component of the Maintenance
costs (for a toll road project,  it is safe to assume that toll road revenues are
positively correlated with maintenance costs).  The value of the correlation
coefficient can be any number from -1  to 1 and is specified in the correlation
coefficient edit box.
18Box4
The beta probability distribution function is given by the following expression:
fix,  ca, B) = k(a,P)*x'-1(1-x)P-,  0< x <1, cr, ,B  > 0,
Where the coefficient k(a,,)  = F(a+c )/F(u)/F(l3) does not depend on x.  It can be easily shown
that:
1t=  E(X)  =  a/(o+P
a2=  Var(X) = CCp/(a+p+,)/(a+2
m = Mode(X)  = (a-1)/(ct+P-2)










Figure 8:  Beta  Density  Function
Beta  Density  Function  (alpha=2, beta = 5)
2
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19Debt Capital  Info
1  Capital  Info
r-Debt  Y  um-ar----  -~  ￿---  ~  ~~  ~------~~
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The Debt Capital Info dialog has two components: "Debt Summary" and "Debt
Instruments."  The "Debt Summary" serves two functions: (i) it shows the total amount
of debt capital used in the project, and (ii) it sets a plan for the disbursement of loan
capital over the construction phase of the project.  The data displayed in the debt
summary component cannot be edited and is there only for information purposes.  To
avoid confusion, it is only changed in the input sheet. The "Debt Instruments" section
provides a menu for specifying various sources of debt capital, and their terms.  By
pressing  A.lJ  the user can insert a new debt instrument in the list.  The  .Elki  button
allows the user to modify the information for an existing debt instrument.  When either of
these buttons is pressed, the user is presented with a dialog where the characteristics of
the instrument can be entered.  This dialog is shown on the next page.
20Entering  Detailed  Debt Instrument  Information
The Debt Instnunent  Dialog Box  contains  the following  options:
Nrame.  Allows  the user to associate  a name with any debt.
- Type of debt instrument.  Permits selection  of Loan, Bond,  or Letter  of
Credit.
*  Currency  of the debt instrument. Note that local currency  is defined  as the
currency  in which the operating  revenues  are received
*  Initial Amount.
*  Maturity.
*  Number of Payments/Year.
*  Interest  Rate. Enter in decimal  form. In the case of an interest rate that is
defined as a spread  over a benchmark  such as LIBOR,  enter the projected
values for the benchmark  in the input sheet  under  the variable  labeled  Ir.
Then enter the spread  in decimal  form in the interest  rate box, e.g. a spread
of 120  bps over LIBOR  would  be entered  in this box as 0.012.
21*  Repayment Plan.  May be specified as Equal Payments, Bullet Payment, or
Defined Schedule. The Defined Schedule option allows the user to specify
her own amortization schedule in the input sheet. The corresponding sheet
variable must be labeled according to the format: SAM<loan name>. For
instance, if the name of a given debt instrument is Loanl, the label will be
SAMLoanl.
*  Disbursement Plan over Construction Period.  Provides edit boxes that
allow the user to specify how the disbursement of the debt is distributed
over the construction period.  This information is also stored in the input
sheet under the variables labeled as DBA<debtname>. For instance, if the
name of a given debt instrument is Loan2, the label will be DBALoan2.
Box 5:  Debt Parameters
INFRISK is capable of handling a wide menu of debt instruments, i.e. loans, bonds, and
LCs. This representation is sufficiently general to encompass the main characteristics
n the payment of both a loan and a bond issue.  As an illustration, consider a debt with
the face value $D contracted at time 0, and to mature at time m, where m < T, when T is
the length of concession.  Associated with this debt is a stream of contractual payments,
.e., amortization, interest, and commitment fees, depending on the nature of the debt
nstrument, and characteristics.  Thus, for a given time (X),
DS(t) = AM(X)  + R(-) + COM(r),
where DS = debt service payment, AM  amortization, R = interest, and COM
commitment fees, and
D=  EAM(r)
In the case of a bond with fixed coupons and bullet payments at the maturity dates we
have:
AM(r)  = O,  V T  = 1, m - 1, and AM(m) = D, and R(r) = D x c,
where c is the fixed coupon rate. In the case of a loan, interest is paid on disbursed and
utstanding amounts, and the commitment is charged on the amount committed, but not
yet disbursed.  Amortization is often agreed in advance, including grace periods.  In a
loan with periodic equal payments, the payment is defined as follows:
PMT  = L  (I  + i)-
L  = Initial loan
PAMT  = end of period  payment (equal payments)
i  =  interest rate
N  =  number of end of period payments
The amortization part of the payment is as follows
AMTn = L I(1)Equity Capital Info
The Equity Capital Info dialog is designed to permit the user to store and edit key
information concerning equity capital in a project.  Such information relates to the
amount, currency, and disbursement plan over the construction phase of the project's
equity.
23Ill.  Customizing  and understanding  the simulation  output
Output  Options  Dialog
E  n1  Options
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This dialog allows the customization of the two main types of output generated by
INFRISK: (i) the simulation analysis and (ii) the economic viability analysis.
The simulation analysis provides informnation  on the estimated probability that a
given risk variable will be lower than a specified minimum level (denoted as "minimum"
in the dialog).  These estimates are calculated for each year of the project's lifetime.  The
user can also choose to generate charts showing the probability distribution estimates in a
selected  year  for each risk variable.  Figure  9 shows  a sample  INFRISK  output  sheet;
examples of INFRISK's  chart output can be found in Figures 3-6.
Figure  9:  INFRISK  Output  Shee
hca  1un96g  1997  1993  1399  2000  2001  2802  2003  2004
Numbf  - of  iteralons  I  100I
a
Expected  Dividierds  8.002  9.542,  8.950  7.418  6.710  6.685  2.850.  3.337~  2.375:
Eiqpeoto  Cash  Flow  118.362 120.151 119.357:  118.717 118.705 115.218 110.683 113.189 113.08
Probabit8foity.1dend  below  0  0-178  0.108  0.2,27  0,264.  02312  0-200  0.433  0.3339  0.435
6Eted VaJueof  Debt  Servie  Coverage  1.043  1.857  L.OW4  l.M2  1.0,03  1.006  0.949:  0.935  0.907
ProbabiNlt 1 of  Debt  Service  Coverage  Below  1.25  0.073  0.32  0.917  0.931  2.948  0.347  0.97!  0.805  0.991
cvpavte.Va*of  lnterest CoveTage  1.28i1  .337  1.341A, 1.314  1.334  1.333  1273  1.348  I.8
NJet  Present  Value  of  Cash  Flow  321.5S9
I  Internal  rate  of  aRetur  on  the  Expected  DiVidends  NIA
24Charts of the simulation analysis can also be produced by checking the
appropriate box, if desired.  Figure 10 gives an example of the chart output for the
distribution of the net present value of cash flow.
Figure  10:  INFRISK  Chart Output
-sent  value:Frequencypmnuative  %9  1  :  T 
24SR80  1  }  .10%<  Histogram 4%3  4%
266.38  9.  1.30%
275.52  2l  4.20%'  180 - 100%
288.87  42  8.41%  ~  160  0
297.12  as  17.32%2  140 - S0%
30.37  113M  2  08.3  - 7012
317.62  19  43.54%  100  %
27.87  163  59.86%  i  80  X  4
338.12  184  76.2%  X 0  3
348.37  94  85.89%  4020
3M8.62 24S.877  t.89%  0  i  0%
368.87  420 970%  0  9.0%
379.12  1  299.10%  5  ~  ~~
388.37  5  99.60%
399.62  2  89.80  11  e  r  §  ~OI
409.87,  2 100.00%  N  et pre  s  ent valIue of NC  F
More  0  00.00%
Sumnmary
Men 321.117.
Standard  i  24.76
Median  321  .768
Min  245  .877
Mx  409.867
Count  1000_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
The economic viability analysis can be undertaken from the perspectives of the
parties involved in an infrastructure project: the project promoter (investor), the creditor,
and the host government.  This analysis will show whether the probability of a given
variable meeting the specified criterion falls within the accepted confidence level.  A
"pass" result indicates that the estimated probability generated by the Monte Carlo
simulation is below that specified by the user "confidence level."  The viability analysis
provides the following options:
*  From the investor's perspective:
(a) Probability of the internal rate of return being smaller than a specified level.
(b) Probability of the net present value being smaller than zero should be smaller
than the specified level.
(c) Probability of dividend being negative or smaller than the specified level.
*  From the creditor's perspective:
(a) Probability of the interest coverage ratio being smaller than a specified level.
(b) Probability of the debt service ratio being smaller than a specified level.
*  From the government's perspective:
(a) Probability of social benefits from the project being smaller than a specified
level.
25The economic  viability  analysis  report provides  the user with information  on each
particular  constraint.  The output explains  why the project does not pass certain
requirements. Figure 11 shows  an example  of the viability  output.
Figure  11:  INFRISK  Economic  Viability  Output
Test  Name  Test Result  Maximum  Year  of
Probability  of  First
Being  Below  Failure
Acceptable  Level
Dividend  failed  0.978  1996
IRR  test  NA
NPV  passed  0.000
Debt  Service  coverage  ratio  failed  1.000  1996
Interest  coverage  ratio  failed  0.924  1996
Social  Benefits  not  selected
Box 6:  Computation  of NPV and IRR in INFRISK
1.  NPV.  INFRISK calculates NPV in according to the following equation:
NPV=Ec(_1)  ES, +  LS, +BS, +  NCFj
(1  + r)N  =' (1  + r)i+c
Where c and o are the respective number of construction and operation periods, and
ES;,=  Equity allocation during 14h  construction period
ES,  =  Loan allocation during  i construction period
BSj  =  Bond allocation during i  construction period
NCFi  =  Net cash flow associated with the project in ii" operating period
NCF  =  TOR-TOE-TAX+DEP (see also ANNEX 1)
r  =  a specified annual discount rate
2.  IRR.  The IRR function is closely related to NPV.  It is the rate that equates NPV to a value of
zero (from the point of view of the investor).  However, the cash flow used for NPV and IRR in
INFRISK is not the same.  For IRR we use the Equity on the negative side and the Dividend on the
positive side of the equation.  The solution is found using the Excel built-in function which
employs an iterative method that clearly depends on starting values.  Theoretically, there may be as
many solutions as the power of the respective polynomial; however, we solve for a local solution
close to the assumed discount rate.  If no solution is returned by the Excel IRR function, we
indicate this situation by printing N/A in the corresponding cell.
26Annex 1: Project  Financial  Accounts
Indiantown  Cogeneration  Project,  selected  years
A.  Project  Initial  Capitalization  (Construction  Phase)
1993
Bonds  (disbursed  in year)  BS  127.21
Equity  (disbursed  in year)  ES  30.32
Letters  of credit  LCS  0.00
Loans  LS  0.00
Construction  Costs  CK  109.68
Financing  Costs  during  Construction  IK  9.89
Other  capital  expenditures  OK  49.85
Debt  service  reserve  DRK  0.00
Total Capital  Expenditures  KS=CK+IK+DRK+OK  169.42
Ending  Exch  Rate  Et  1.00
B. Income-Expenditure  Table
1996
Operating  Revenues  OR  185.45
Investment  Income  INV  3.36
Total  Operating  Revenues  TOR  188.81
Operation  and Maintenance  OME  11.55
Insurance  and Administration  INSA  0.00
Fees  on Loans  FEE  0.00
Other  Expenses  14.59
Disposal  Cost  48.49
Other  Operating  Expenses  OEE  63.08
Total  Operating  Expenses  TOE=OME+FEE+OEE+INSA  74.63
Interest  Payment  INTP  57.69
Tax Withheld  WTX  0
Scheduled  Amortization  SAM  8.80
Depreciation*  DEP  43.87
Income  Before  Taxes  INBT  12.62
Tax  TAX  3.78
C.  Cash  Flows  Table
1996
Income  Before  Taxes  INBT  12.62
Total  Debt Service  TDS  66.49
Equity  Funds  EF  140
Debt  Funds  DF  675
Capital  Expenditure  CKF=CK+OK  159.53
Loan  Repayment  LAM  0.00
Bond  Repayment  BAM  8.80
Credit  Letter  Repayment  LCAM  0.00
Debt Repayment  DAM=LAM+BAM+CAM  8.80
Tax  TAX  3.78
Operating  Cash  Flow  OCF=OR-OME-INSA  197.00
Net Cash  Flow  NCF=TOR-TOE-  177.26
TAX+DEP
Equity  Cash  Flows  (Dividend)  DIV=TOR-TOE-TDS  47.69
General  Account  GA  0.00
Debt  Service  Reserve  Fund  DSR  0.00
Maintenance  Account  MA  0
Exchange  Rate  Xt  1.00
*In general  DEP can  be a non linear  function  of CK, i(CK)
Note: INVf  (G,A,  r) where  r= applicable  interest  rate
27Annex 2:  Details  on generation  of random  variates  for Monte-Carlo
Simulation
This section  describes  the computational  methodology  for generating  the four
classes  of probability  distributions  - uniform,  normal,  lognormal,  and beta  - that are used
in the Monte Carlo  simulation  adapted  in INFRISK.
Uniform  random  variate
The uniform  random  variate  u is generated  using a built-in Excel  function  RAND.
This function  returns  a (0,1)  variable.  To transform  it with an error term possessing  a
required standard  deviation,  we first standardize  u a by centering  around  the mean value




Then we multiply  u* by the desired  standard  deviation.
Normal  random  variate.
Following  Maindonald  (1984),  we used the Marsaglia  and Bray's polar method  (a
variation  of Box-Muller  method).
Step 1.  Generate  uniformn  (0,1) variates  ul, u2.  Transform  them into uJ=2uI-l,
U2=2U2- 1, so that new uniform  variables  will be distributed  in (-1,1)
Step2.  Let w =  u2 + u2, if w > I skip and select a new pair of uniform ul, u2 until
the restriction  is satisfied.
Step 3  Set v  ,then set  z = ulv which  will serve  as a standard
normal (0,1) variate  that is further  transformed  by multiplying  by the
desirable  standard  deviation  and adding  the projected  mean  /trend.
Lognormal  variate
The lognormal  variate  is obtained  by first generating  a normal  variate  and
applying  the exponential  transformation  to new series y = exp(ln(Y)  + zo)  where  z is a
standard  normal variate.  The user should  bear in mind  that when supplying  a for the
lognormal  distribution,  he should  convert  it into a log scale  himself
Beta random  variate
The beta random  variate  with parameters  a and P is generated  by using the
following  simple  algorithm  adopted  from Maindonald.
Step 1  Generate uniform (0,1) variables ul, u2.
28Step 2  Let v, =  u/'a  +24"
Step 3  if w=vl+v2 < 1 put x=vl/w.  Otherwise, take new ul,  u2. and go to Step
2.
INFRISK always assumes a = 2, fr=5 because the resulting distribution is skewed
to a reasonable degree, as was justified in some experiments. Thus, obtained beta variate
is standardized by subtracting its mean and dividing by its standard deviation (see Box 5).
The obtained standardized variate is further transformed by multiplying by the desirable
standard deviation and adding the projected mean /trend.
29Annex 3: Preparing  data on projected  variables  in the Input  Sheet
To perform analysis on her own data, the user should provide a sheet with certain
variables for the construction and operation periods. We already mentioned that the
projected values for the simulated variables can be stored in the input sheet. Also there
are some other "non-risk" variables that can be stored in the input sheet.
It is important that the user follows the right format when entering the data in the
input sheet. The first column will normally have the name of the variable of interest
(optional), while the second column must contain the correct label of the variable, which
is not optional. The third column must contain the identified units (currency).  The US
dollar should be specified as USD. The next columns are the data columns, which must
contain the numerical values for the corresponding variables  The data are split into two
tables, one for the construction phase, the other for the operating phase. Each table must
have a heading line that contains the year identifiers in the corresponding columns as well
as table identifiers in the second column (see example in the Figure ). Those are  YRCON
for the construction table, and YROPER for the operation table.
Sources  of Uncertainty  Labels
Revenues  OR
Operations  & Maintenance  OME
Other  Operating  Expenses  OEE
Investment  Income  INV
Ending  Exch Rate*  Xt
Interest  Rate  Ir
Construction  Costs  /Equity**  CK/ES
*  The exchange rate is a macroeconomic variable and the data should be provided for
both construction (if it is not omitted) and operation period. In the former case, the label
is Et, in the latter Xt. The exchange rate is always in terms of local currency/USD
* *if the source of uncertainty is associated with construction costs, it also automatically
makes equity random so as to balance sources and uses of the funds
The user can also store in the input sheet information on the ranges of all
simulated variables. The labels for these data should follow the format: <variable
label>RANGE; for instance, ORRange for the Revenues. This information will be used if
the user selects the Estimatedfrom  Projected Ranges option for the error standard
deviation of the simulated variable.
The following variables are not considered  sources of uncertainty and are
optional. If omitted in the input sheet they will be assumed to have a value of zero.
Non-random  variables  for the  Labels
construction  period
Debt Service  Reserve  DRK
Other capital  Expenditures  OK
Interest during  construction  IrC
Exchange  rate durung  construction  Et
Financing  Costs  during  IK
30Construction
Non-random variables for the  Labels
operation period
Insurance and Administration  INSA
Deposits to Major Maintenance  DMA
Accounts
Withheld tax payment  WTP
Fees on Loans  FEE
Non-random  part of the revenues*  NR
*This quantity will be added to the random part of the revenues in all subsequent
calculations and is useful when we need to model the stream of revenues as consisting of
two parts, one effected by random factors and the other fixed at certain level.
As was explained earlier, the user can also store in the input sheet information on
the amortization schedules for the loans. The labels for these data should follow the
format SAM<loanname>; for  instance, if the name of the loan is LOANI, then the
information on the amortization schedule should be stored in the row labeled as SAM
LOAN 1. This information will be utilized by INFRISK when the user specifies the
repayment plan as Defined Schedule  in the Parameters of the Debt Instrument dialog.
31Annex 4: Charts
Probability  of Insufficient  Debt
Coverage Under Different Scenarios
f  80%  Interest  Rate  =  10.5%
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